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NSC BRIEFING

8 November 1954

SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

- Reactions to General Collins' mission vary.
 - A. Paris officials welcome it;
 hope US support for Diem waning.

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В.

- C. General Ely feared mission would appear as US intent "takeover"
- D. But later his deputy described it as logical move.
- E. Added, French position is: Diem must make peace with army, get capable interior minister (no doubt Tam)
- II. Bao Dai still very much in the act.
- A. Saw Collins mission useful to

 demand Diem be more co-operative.

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- 3. Says he is father of "naughty children" who must be brought into line.
- C. His emissary now in Saigon with order to Hinh proceed Paris for consultations, but Bao Dai sees Hinh's services still essential and wants Bay Vien in cabinet.
- D. Diem reportedly having trouble raising some \$1,500,000, price for Bao Dai's "support."
- III. Meanwhile Buu Hoi build-up growing.
 - A. French press giving him big play.
 - B. Has backing of some of Mendes' principal advisers.
 - C. They reported pressuring Bao Dai
 to put him in before Mendes
 leaves for US.
- IV. Several possible French motives for backing Buu Hoi.

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- A. One may be keep pot boiling, leave room for maneuver.
- B. More important, Buu Hoi's background jibes with French desires get along with Viet Minh.
- C. Buu Hoi "incredibly naive," according Heath, thus probably easily manipulated.
- D. Diem describes him as not immoral, but amoral, a "seive for money," with two French and other mistresses.
- E. Told Diem year ago he for Viet

 Minh because it efficient.